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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL
ANALYSIS OR TO ALTERNATIVELY
DISMISS THE ACTION.
In appellant's brief, the following claim is made:
Appellant contends that the act of
leaving his blood specimens at room temperature is tantamount to destroying those samples.
Appellant's brief, at p. 19.
This contention is not supported by any evidence or
testimony in the record yet appellant uses the bold assumption
to develop an argument of a prejudicial destruction and/or
suppression of evidence in violation of the holding of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed2d 215 [1963).
Respondent urges that such a conclusion is not only
unwarranted by the absence of such evidence in the record, but a
careful review of relevant statutes and case law also reveals
that appellant's reliance on destruction and suppression of evidence
and duty to disclose cases is misplaced.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

41-6-44.10 [d)

(Supp. 1977) indicates

that where a person suspected of driving under the influence of
alcohol has had his blood tested for alcohol content,
Upon the request of the person who was
tested, the results of such test or tests
shall be made available to him.
(Emphasis added.)
-29a-
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Thus, in the area of blood alcohol testing specific
variations from traditional evidence disclosure principles are
present.

In the above quoted statute, the accused must make a

specific request for the results of the tests made on his blood.
If such a request is not made, or is made untimely (see infra),
then the State is under no duty to make even the test "results"
available to the accused, let alone the blood alcohol samples
themselves.
Another statute further amplifies this duty on an accuse:
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 .10 (f)

(Supp. 1977) states:

The person to be tested may, at his own
expense, have a physician of his own choosing
administer a chemical test in addition to the
test or tests administered at the direction of
a peace officer. The failure or inability to
obtain such additional test shall not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or
tests taken at the direction of a peace officer,
nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be
taken at the direction of a peace officer.
Such additional test shall be subsequent to the
test or tests administered at the direction of
a peace officer.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, appellant, by statute, is accorded the clear
opportunity to have a separate, independent analysis done on
his blood by a physician of his own choosing.

Yet, his failure

to do so will not bar the admissibility of the test results
obtained by the arresting officers.

Yet, appellant claims that

if the blood samples taken at the request of the state are not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29b-

State of Utah v. Johnnie M. Chavez
Respondent's Additional Authorities
Case No. 16132
reserved for him so that he may later conduct an independent
analysis of the same samples, then the state's samples should be
rendered inadmissible.

This logic defies the clear intent and

language of Utah Code Ann.,

§

41-6-44.10 (f) supra, and is directly

contrary to Utah law and respondent urges the court to reject it.
Several states have dealt with the question of whether
a defendant's preclusion (for whatever reason) from running a
post-test on a breathalyzer ampoule or blood alcohol sample should
require the exclusion of the State's test result.

In State v.

Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 332, 487 P.2d 399 (1971), the Supreme
Court of Arizona was faced with this question.

There, the state

was unable to produce the test ampoule for inspection and re-testing
by

defendant since the state had discarded the ampoule "pursuant

to standard procedure."

487 P.2d at 400.

In establishing the

requirement with which the defendant had to comply in order to
suppress the admission of the State's test result, the Arizona
Court ruled that the defendant
. must show how the production of
the requested evidence would aid in the
presentation of his defense. In the instant
case [defendant] has failed to show how the
post test chemical composition of the test
ampoule, had it not been discarded, could have
made a valid contribution to his defense.
487 P.2d at 401
Since the defendant in Superior Court could not meet
the burden of showing how the post-test would have aided in his
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defense, the court rejected the motion to suppress and remanded
the case for trial.
This re~uirement was restated later by the Arizona
Court of Appeals in State v. Canter, 116 Ar:z. 356, 569 P.2d 298
(1977):

Our Supreme Court rejected the contention
that due process requires the State to produce
the ampule for testing in State v. Superior Court,
[supra] and therein ruled that a defendant must
make a prior showing that the requested evidence
would aid in his case before the trial court can
order production.
In that case as in this one
there was no prior showing made by the defendant.
116 Ariz. at 358.
That defendants must make such a showing is also a
holding of People v. Hedrick, 557 P. 2d 378 (Colo., 1976).

There,

the Colorado Supreme Court applied the Brady v. Maryland, supra,
test to the question of post-test analysis by defendants.
court noted that the Brady test:.
•
. asks the questions:
1)
whether the evidence was suppressed by the
prosecution after a request by the defense;
2) whether the evidence is favorable to the
defense, i. e., exculpatory in nature; and
3) whether the evidence is material.

* * *

The defendant in the case at bar has
failed to meet any of the three prongs of
the test, all three of which must be met
in order to support an argument that there
has been a denial of due process.
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The first factor to be considered
is whether there has been a suppression of
evidence by the prosecution and, if so,
whether such suppression took place after a
request by the defense for the evidence.
There was no evidence here that the test
as given could have been preserved. The
request for a breath sample was first made
through the defendant's "Motion to Produce,"
many months after the defendant was arrested
and the breath test taken.
There is no claim that the alleged
failure to have a sample available was deliberate.

* * *

Herein there simply was no evidence in
this record that there was suppression or
non-disclosure of evidence by the prosecution
and we therefore do not reach to the other
factors.

* * *

In summary, where there is a failure, as
here, to prove that the evidence is preservable or that there was any prejudice to defendant
by failure to have available to him a breath
sample, we must hold that the wider interests
of society favor the admissibility of the test
results at trial.
557 P.2d at 380-382
Some jurisdictions have required that a defendant meet
this burden of showing the exculpatory evidence present in a
post-test by use of expert witnesses.

In State v. Teare, 135

N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (1975) where!!£ expert had testified,

the court, on the State's appeal of the suppression order, remanded for a thorough development of the issues involved.

On

the second appeal, the court ruled as follows:
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Based on the testimony and evidence presented
at this hearing the court finds as fact:
1 .. It is presently impossible to preserve
the breathalyzer ampules so as to reliably eliminate all the factors which cause unpredictable
changes in the ampule contents subsequent to the
administering of the breathalyzer test.

2.
The reactions begun inside the ampule
by the original breathalyzer test continue in
an unpredictable and uncontrollable manner.
These unpredictable reactions cause subsequent
analysis or retesting of the ampule to be totally
unreliable evidence as a check on the accuracy
or validity of the original breathalyzer test.
3. There is no predictable relationship
to the changes that occur within the test ampule
and the passage of time.
4. At the present time subsequent retesting
or chemical analysis of the test ampules provides
no acceptable scientific relationship to the
accuracy or validity of the original test results.
5.
The theory of Dr. Volpe and the experimentation of Dr. Jones have not been thoroughly
tested or scientifically scrutinized as to be
considered acceptable as scientific fact or
accurate enough to produce results admissible
as evidence.
CONCLUSION
Preservation of the test ampule is not
feasible or practical since subsequent testing
will not give any scientifically reliable results,
this being due to the uncontrollable changes that
occur in the breathalyzer test ampules after
their use in the breathalyzer test.
Furthermore,
even if these changes or variations could be
scientifically accounted for and accurately
analyzed, you still could not properly analyze
a test ampule subsequent to a breathalyzer t~st
because there is simply no predictable relationship between the changes that occur and the lapse
of time.
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
342
A.2d
at Funding
558.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-29fmay contain errors.

State of Utah v. Johnnie M. Chavez
Respondent's Additional Authorities
Case No. 16132
Respondent makes no claim as to the similarities
between breathalyzer tests and blood tests.

It may well be that

the above discussed "impossibility," "unpredictability" and
"uncontrollable" problems that exist in breathalyzer t.ests are
generally applicable to blood sample re-testing.

But the important

point is the requirement seen in Teare that expert testimony must
be given in order for a defendant to establish the necessity of
his post-test claims.

Defendants, though, often find such

expert testimony damaging to their position.
In People v. Stark, 73 Mich. App. 332, 251 N.E.2d 574
(1977), for example, an expert witness testified that in only
~

of the 200 ampoule retesting that he had conducted had he

found any significant variation in the results of the first test
and the later one.

He also admitted that used ampoules are of

little value after 30 days.

(In Stark the defendant had waited

72 days before requesting the ampoule for retesting.)

So rigidly does Oregon hold to the requirement of expert
witness testimony to support a defendant's claim, that in State v.
~. 550 P.2d 1403

(Ore., 1976) the court ruled that the

defendant had not made the necessary showing of the value to
him of retesting the ampoule, even though in State v. Michener,
550 P. 2d 449 (Ore., 1976)

(decided just 20 days before Reaves)

the court ruled that the defendant had properly showed how the
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retesting would be to his benefit and the State's evidence was

,

therefore, suppressed.
Another ·important aspect that should be emphasized is
that where the "destruction" of evidence is not done maliciously
or in an effort to subvert defendant's case, courts have been
unwilling to suppress the State's evidence or dismiss charges.
In State v. Watson, 4B Ohio App. 2d 110, 355 N.E. 2d 8B3 (1975)
the court held:
. where there is no evidence that the
ampoule and solution, if preserved, could be
scientifically examined so as to produce conclusive results, nor that is was maliciously destroyed,
the results of the breathalyzer test may be
admitted.
355 N.E.2d at 8B5 (Emphasis added.)
This view was also followed in State v. Myers,
BB N.W. 16, 536 P.2d 2BO

(1975).

It should be noted at this point that
the sample was exhausted by the state in the
conduct of its tests, so that no part of it
remained for the defendant to test.
The court will not adopt a construction
of a statute which will lead to unreasonable
results.
The record shows neither intent on
the part of the state to destroy evidence nor
any negligence by the state since all the blood
was used in the tests conducted. The statute
cannot insulate defendant "against the "slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune", which may
strike anyone at any time and are unfortunately
incidental to life itself." United States v.
Pate, 31B F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1963); Nunn v. Cupp,
15 Or.App. 212, 515 P.2d 421 (1973).
-29hSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State of Utah v. Johnnie M. Chavez
Respondent's Additional Authorities
Case No. 16132
We conclude that the results of the
state's tests were admissible regardless
of the fact that defendant had no opportunity
to test the sample.
526 P.2d at 284,
In accord, People v. Hedrick, supra; State v. Superior
~·

supra; and State v. Canter, supra.
A related issue to the question of maliciously destroyed

evidence, as noted in appellant's brief, is that of lost or
accidently destroyed evidence.

In In Interest of Oaks, 571

P.2d 1364 (Utah, 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, noted
that the admission of blood alcohol data would have been proper
in that case "even if the ampoule were lost or destroyed."
571 P.2d at 1365.

The fact that evidence of this nature is often-times
destroyed according to normal operating procedures has also
been acknowledged by several courts.

Foy v. State, 533 P.2d 634

(Okla., 1974); State v. Myers, supra; State v. Superior Court,
supra; and State v. Canter, supra.
Another consideration courts have found to be of
relevance (as above noted) is the issue of timely request for
the independent, post-test.

In People v. Hedrick, supra, the

defendant "made a motion to produce the breath sample" (557
P.2d at 379) nearly three months after the State had run its
breathalyzer test.

This factor, combined with defendant's failure
-29i-
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to show that the test sample could have been preserved to enable
him to conduct a later analysis, persuaded the court to allow
the State to admit the evidence.

In accord, State v. canter,

supra.
The same dilatory, tardy request is present in the
instant matter and respondent submits that the result seen in
Hedrick and Canter therefore is the result .this court should
also follow.

A tangentially-related issue to the admission of such
evidence is that routinely - conducted tests, just as records
kept in the regular course of business, are properly admitted.
Here, respondent contends that the blood tests conducted by
Lynn Davis were done in the ordinary course of his employment and
therefore the reliability of the tests, in the first instance,
must be deemed to be high.

(See Sullivan v. Municipality

of Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070

(Alaska, 1978) and Utah Rules of

Evidence 63 (13) and (15)).
Some courts have also ruled that where ample evidence
was presented by the prosecution of defendant's intoxication,
separate from any blood alcohol tests, the courts refused to
overturn defendant;s conviction even were the tests to be
I

excluded.

(See Foy v. State, supra and People v. Hedrick, ~·'
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One last consideration made in the Hedrick case is the
public policy agreement that "the people [State) have no duty to
give the defendant any chemical test."
~

557 P.2d at 379.

The

court then quoted favorably from State v. Reyera, 92

Idaho 669, 448 P. 2d 762 (1968):
To hold otherwise would be to transform
the accused's right to due process into a power
to compel the State to gather in the accused's
behalf what might be exculpatory evidence. In
this case, the State produced testimonial evidence of intoxication, but it had no obligation
to obtain for appellant what he speculates might
have been more scientific evidence of sobriety.
The State may not suppress evidence, but it need
not gather evidence for the accused.
448 P.2d at 767
In summary, therefore, appellant has not satisfied
either statutory or case law duties of timely requesting a posttest; meeting his burden of showing the exculpatory nature of a
retest; use of expert witnesses to show the "destruction" has
actually occurred and that the "destruction" was malicious or,
at least, greater than accidental and not routinely destroyed;
and convincingly shown that the state should "gather evidence for
the accused."

Therefore, respondent submits that the blood test

results were properly admitted and that the appellant's motion
to suppress the test results was properly denied.
Dated this 13th day of September, 1979.

~£,~.. ;.,__,

Assistant Attorney General
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